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PEKING AND THE LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISTS
Introductory Remarks
Taking Chinese ideological pronouncements at their face value, one
would assuie Peking's interest in Latin America to be determined by the
as sump tion that this area is one of "the storm centers of world revolu-
tion dealing direct blows at imperialism."1
"The anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the people in Asia,
Africa and Latin America" says the Proposal Concerning the General Line,
"are pounding and undermining the foundations of the rule of imperialism
and colonialism. . . . In a sense therefore the whole cause of the inter-
national proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary
struggles of the people of these areas, who constitute the overwhelming
majority of the world's population.
One would thus expect to see a considerable Chinese effort to sup-
port the "revolutionary struggles" in Latin America, particularly in the
form of material and organizational assistance to the Leftist extremist
guerrilla groups operating in several Latin American countries. In actual
fact, however, Chinese support for the guerrillas has so far been largely
verbal. The real Chinese effort in Latin America has been directed at a
very different and far more modest goal: not against the great imperial-
ist foe, the United States, but against Soviet influence in the area.
1 The CCP's Proposal Concerning the General Line of the Interna-
tional Communist Movement, June ,14, 1963, reproduced in William E.
Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press,
1964), p. 265.
2 Loc. cit.
2Specifically the Chinese have attempted to wean the weak and ineffective
Latin American Communist parties from their allegiance to Moscow. Having
failed in this, they have endeavored to split pro-Chinese factions off
from these parties. It is significant that in the few cases where they
have succeeded in doing so, the new pro-Chinese parties have not attempted
to set up guerrilla fronts nor have they united with existing guerrilla
movements.
In Latin America as elsewhere one is thus struck by the discrepancy
between the grandiloquence of Chinese ideological declamations, which
give the impression of megolomania and an utterly distorted, totally un-
realistic view of the world, and Peking's actual policy, which for all
its errors and failures appears to have been devised with a complete aware-
ness of China's very limited means and possibilities.
Chinese Ideological Pronouncements:
The "National-Democratic" Theme
The formula "national and democratic" appears in Chinese
pronouncements concerning Latin America as early as 1960. Reporting a
speech by Chu Tu-nan, President of the China-Latin America Friendship
Association, Peking Review, III, 35, of August 30, 1960, refers to "the
vigorous development of the national and democratic movements in Latin
America." The Greetings of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party to the Fifth Congress of the Brazilian Communist Party, a document
dated August 12, 1960," praised that party for its efforts to develop "a
Published in Peking Review, III, 37, September 14, 1960.
2national and democratic united front." It claimed that "owing to the
ever increasing strength of the socialist camp and the vigorous develop-
ment of the national and democratic movements in Africa, Asia and Latin
America, U.S. imperialism has become isolated," and wished the Brazilian
Communist Party "new successes and achievements . . . in the cause of
defending the Cuban Revolution and the national and democratic movements
in Latin America .
An editorial in the Peking People's Daily of December 26, 19604
claims that "Today . . . the tide of national and democratic revolution
in Latin America is surging to unprecedented heights." The article then
defines the "basic objective" of the Latin American peoples in their
present revolution as being "to free themselves from every kind of U.S.
imperialist domination and control, and to achieve complete victory in
their national and democratic revolution by safeguarding their national
independence and sovereignty and developing a prosperous economy in their
respective countries and improving the livelihood of their peoples."
The term again appears in the resolution of the Chinese Central
Committee on the Moscow November 1960 meeting of Communist parties, which
was passed on January 18, 1961.5 This resolution asserts that the "rise
of the national and democratic revolutions is a great development second
only to the formation of the world socialist system." Later the formula
"national and democratic" was modified by omission of the word "and." A
Reprinted in Peking Review, III, 52, December 27, 1960.
5 See Peking Review, IV, 4, January 27, 1961.
4"survey of 1961," "Latin America on the Move," published in Peking Review,
V, 2, January 12, 1962, states that "during 1961, the national democratic
movement in Latin America has thus not only repulsed repeated U.S. im-
perialist attacks but broadened and deepened." In these forms, with or
without "and," with or without a hyphen, it reappears in general policy
statements and in documents referring to Latin American affairs through-
out the following years. Thus, the "Proposal Concerning the General Line
of the International Communist Movement" of June 14, 1963, states of "the
vast areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America," that:
"The national democratic revolutionary movement in these areas and
the international socialist revolutionary movement are the two great his-
torical currents of our time."
"The national democratic revolution in these areas is an important
component of the contemporary proletarian world revolution."6
The formula appears again in a report on Chinese support for the
"Dominican Peoples Anti-U.S. Struggle" in Peking Review, VIII, 21, May 21,
1965, according to which Mayor P'eng Chen of Peking referred to this
struggle as "marking a new upsurge of the national-democratic movement."
It again appears in Lin Piao's article "Long Live the Victory of
People's War." But this time with an important qualification. As
originally used, emphasis had been on the broadness of the national demo-
cratic front. "Workers, peasants, intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie and
national bourgeoisie--all have had their fill of enslavement, exploitation,
and oppression by U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. It is therefore not
6 Griffith, op. cit., p. 265.
Peking Review, VIII, 36, September 3, 1965.
5only necessary but also entirely possible for these classes and social
strata to line up in the broadest national democratic united front against
their enemies." Lin Piao, on the other hand, stresses the leading role
of the working class and the decisive importance of the worker-peasant
alliance within the broader united front:
"History shows that during the national-democratic revolution there
must be two kinds of alliance within this united front, first, the worker-
peasant alliance and, second, the alliance of the working people with the
bourgeoisie and other non-working people. The worker-peasant alliance is
an alliance of the working class with the peasants and all other working
people in town and country. It is the foundation of the united front.
Whether the working class can gain leadership of the national-democratic
revolution depends on whether it can lead the broad masses of the peasants
in struggle and rally them around itself. Only when the working class
gains leadership of the peasants, and only on the basis of the worker-
peasant alliance, is it possible to establish the second alliance, form a
broad united front and wage a people's war victoriously. Otherwise,
everything that is done is unreliable like parcels in the air or so much
empty talk."9
It will be noted that in Chinese usage the term "national democratic"
is always employed to describe revolutions, movements, or fronts. It is
never used to characterize a state or regime, as in the Declaration of the
Peking Review, V, 7, February 16, 1962.
9 Peking Review, VIII, 36, September 3, 1965.
6November 1960 Conference of Communist parties in Moscow and in subsequent
Soviet statements. 10
We have seen that the Chinese already employ the term "national
and democratic" as applied to revolutions, movements and alliances,
months before the November 1960 conference. One can only surmise that
in the editorial commission which prepared the conference declaration
the Russians took up this Chinese formula and twisted it in order to
apply it to states and regimes. The "state of national democracy" is
described in the Moscow Declaration as "a state which consistently up-
holds its political and economic independence, fights against imperialism
and its military blocs, and against military bases on its territory; a
state which fights against the new forms of colonialism and the penetra-
tion of imperialist capital; a state which rejects dictatorial and des-
potic forms of government; a state in which the people are assured broad
democratic rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, press, assembly, demon-
strations, establishment of political parties and public organizations),
the opportunity to work for the enactment of an agrarian reform and the
realization of other democratic and social changes and for participation
in shaping government policy.""
10 I am indebted to Professor Uri Ra'anan for drawing my attention to
this interesting difference. For the concept of the "national-democratic
state" as evolved in the Declaration and subsequently employed by the
Russians, see Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (New
York: Atheneum Press, 1964), pp. 360-362, and Richard Lowenthal, "National
Democracy and the Post-Colonial Revolution" in Kurt London, Ed., New Nations
in a Divided World (New York, London: Praeger, 1963), pp. 56-74.
11 Quoted from the manual, Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, Moscow,
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 2nd Edition, 1963, pp. 421-422.
7Peking's dislike of this concept is illustrated by the fact that
it did not even apply it to Cuba. The Chinese frequently referred to the
"Cuban people's revolution," sometimes qualifying it as a "national and
democratic revolution."12
On April 16, 1961, Castro himself proclaimed the Cuban Revolution
12
to be a socialist one, but Peking was remarkably slow in acknowledging
this. It was not until September 17, 1962 one and a half years later,
that a statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized
the socialist nature of the Cuban Revolution.14 A further Chinese govern-
ment statement, on November 30, 1962, stated that during the missile
crisis, the Cuban people had "defended the honor of a socialist country."1 5
12 See i.a. the speech of Wu Hsiu-Chuan on August 19, 1960 at the
Eighth Congress of the Cuban People's Socialist Party (Communist) reported
in Peking Review, III, 34, August 23, 1960, and Chu Tu-nan's speech on
December 26, 1960 at the Peking rally in honor of the China-Latin America
Friendship Week, reported in Peking Review, III, 52, December 27, 1960.
1 In his speech on the eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion, reported
in Revolucion, Havana, April 17, 1961.
14 "The Chinese government once again solemnly assures the Cuban
Government that the Cuban people . . . in defense of their socialist
revolution, will forever enjoy the all-out support of the 650 million
fraternal Chinese people." Peking Review, V, 39, September 28, 1962.
15 Peking Review, V, 49, December 7, 1962.
8The statement went on to proclaim that "Premier Fidel Castro is worthy
of being cnlledI a staunch Marxist-Leninist revolutionary fighter. " A
People's Daily article of Decemoer 2, 1962 "Tito and the Cuban Revolution"
hailed Cuba as "the first great socialist country in Latin America. In
the same article Peking at long last answered a question which it had
hitherto left open, namely the question as to the nature of the regime
which had first "completed the tasks of a thoroughgoing national and
democratic revolution" and then "resolutely embarked on the road of
socialist revolution." This was--"the first people's regime in Cuban
history. " Throughout these years Peking had never applied the terms
"national democratic state" or "national democratic regime" to Cuba.
The notion of a benevolent albeit non-socialist, national democratic
state is of course profoundly revisionist, i.e. not reconcilable with
orthodox Marxism-Leninism. But besides this doctrinaire consideration,
there appears to have been a sound practical reason for Peking's rejec-
tion of the concept: the term could easily be used as ideological justi-
fication for Soviet aid to non-socialist countries. The Chinese are
against such Soviet aid. As for their own modest aid programs, they have
hitherto avoided underpinning them with elaborate ideological constructions.
One riddle remains to be solved. The Chinese reject the concept
of the national democratic state. Why, then, their infatuation with the
national democratic formula as applied to movements, fronts, struggles
and revolutions- -and this specifically in regard to Latin America, while
Peking Review, V, 49., December 7, 1962.
9they rarely if ever use the same formula in regard to Africa and Asia?
One might assume from this that Peking attaches special importance to the
non-Communist, Leftist extremist guerrilla groups of Latin America who
might be classified as national-democratic. But as we have already pointed
there is no hard evidence of Chinese material aid to, or organizational
links, with these groups. The difference between Chinese operations in
Latin America and Africa is that in Latin America Chinese efforts are con-
centrated mainly on the local Communist parties.
Paradoxically it would appear that the formula of the broad national
democratic front or movement was devised precisely with the intention of
impressing these parties. The Communist parties of Latin America are, as
we shall see, utterly and incorrigibly opportunistic, with a history of
unprincipled alliances with the most diverse moderate and even rightist
political groups. By stressing the need for "workers, peasants, intel-
lectuals, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie" to line up "in the
broadest possible national democratic united front," Peking indicated
to these parties that it did not demand of them to change their policies.
Peking was perfectly willing to condone the opportunism of the Latin
American Communist parties. All it asked of them was their vote in the
councils of international communism. Only when this approach failed did
the Chinese mobilize the dogmatic, sectarian elements of the Latin Ameri-
can Communist parties in order to form splinter parties which have so far
in practice been no more militant than the parties remaining loyal to Moscow.
17 People's Daily editorial of February 10, 1962 on the second Havana
Declaration, as reported in Peking Review, V, 7, February 16, 1962.
The Communist Parties of Latin America
Latin American communism never produced a Mao Tse-tung to lead it
out of the cities into the countryside. In practice as well as in theory
the Latin American Communist parties have always clung to the orthodox
Marxist-Leninist doctrine that the industrial proletariat is the decisive
revolutionary force. In consequence they have remained almost exclusively
urban groups. In a few cases, they managed to obtain some influence among
plantation workers, but their frequent calls for a "worker-peasant alli-
ance were rarely backed up by any effective measures to spread party in-
fluence to the peasantry. 18
As a first step in the process of rallying the working class around
its vanguard, the party, the Latin American Communist Parties engaged in
extensive trade union activities. Today, some three or four decades after
their foundation, they have still not progressed beyond this preliminary
step. With the exception of Chile, there is not one single Latin American
country in which they have managed to win the permanent allegiance of any
sizeable fraction of the working class. As a whole, the rank and file
members of the unions on which they have concentrated their attentions
have proved impervious to the attraction of Marxist-Leninist ideologies.
This may be because in most Latin American countries the industrial pro-
letariat is a new social group, privileged in comparison with the rural
proletariat from whose ranks it has risen, protected by effective social
18 Only in recent years has the strongest of the Latin American
parties, that of Chile, assigned cadres to systematic work in the country-
side and obtained a considerable measure of success in this work.
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legislation, with a relatively high wage level and lacking any militant
socialist or syndicalist tradition. 19
Although they have failed to win over the rank-and-file union members
and made little or no impression on the sub-proletariat of the shanty towns
which ring the big cities of Latin America, the Communists did manage to
infiltrate the trade union bureaucracy and thus obtain key positions in
the trade union organizations of many Latin American countries. But
these successes are impressive on paper only. The Latin American trade
union movement20 is fragmented, hemmed in by legal restrictions, and finan-
cially very weak, and what is worse, the bulk of the union members lack
any deep sense of commitment to their leaders, and easily acquiesce if
these are replaced by the government.
Under these circumstances the union leaders have to rely on govern-
ment backing in labor disputes, and indeed on government good will merely
to hold their posts. Communist union officials do not escape this iron
rule. Being desperately anxious to maintain their trade union positions,
the Communist party leaderships are thus under constant pressure to reach
19 Only the Chilean working class has a continuous tradition of
several generations of militancy. From the first years of the 20th century
onwards socialist, anarchist and IWW influence was strong among the workers
of the nitrate fields in the Northern deserts of Chile. After the collapse
of the nitrate mining industry in the 1920's, the miners flocked south to
central Chile where they were finally absorbed into the new industries
which sprang up in the late 1930's and 1940's.
20 With the exception of Argentina, where it was built up to con-
siderable strength by the dictator Peron.
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some sort of accommodation with the government of the day, whatever its
political complexion.
In the case of dictatorial governments, there is in addition the
constant fear of police action: lacking strong roots in any sector of
the population, the Communists cannot survive in conditions of genuine
clandestinity. They are thus forced to come to terms with dictatorial
governments even more than with democratic ones. And the dictators, even
the most vociferously anti-Communist ones, have frequently been willing
to conclude agreements by which the Party, even though officially sup-
pressed, may maintain a skeleton organization, some positions in the
trade unions and perhaps even a publication, and be it only a literary
journal, in order to propagate Marxist-Leninist ideas. In return open
support of the dictator is rarely requested or even desired. The Party
spokesman may denounce him in the most violent terms, especially in the
pages of the World Marxist Review, a publication of limited circulation
in Latin America and well-nigh unintelligible to those who are not famil-
iar with the complicated terminology of Marxism-Leninism. What is asked
of the party is merely that it shall not unite with the democratic opposi-
tion, and especially that it help to prevent that opposition from obtaining
complete control of the trade union movement. The leadership of most Latin
American Communist parties has become highly skilled in carrying out these
agreements while maintaining a fagade of leftist extremism, and also at
assessing the proper moment to desert a sinking governmental ship. i
The Communist parties have thus managed to survive in spite of their
weakness and even to carve out for themselves a modest niche in the Latin
13
American political establishment. Most frequently their function is to
split the opposition to a dictatorial or democratic government, but they
also lend their services to moderate leftist governments, such as that
of Belaunde Terry in Peru, when these are willing to accept them.
The Communist parties of Latin America thus are small, urban based
groups of intellectuals, with some student backing and a minimal working
class following, led by professional politicians who hire out their
services, not for money but for small political favors such as the per-
mission to hold closed meetings, to publish a newssheet or literary
journal, and to occupy a few trade union posts. These men are not venal.
Their corruption is of a more insidious kind. They can be bought not by
money, but simply by providing the minimal conditions needed to allow them
and their followers to maintain the illusion of being the "vanguard" des-
tined to lead the proletariat to victory in its struggle for the libera-
tion of mankind.
Latin American communism thus is far from being the diabolically
efficient conspiracy for the conquest of power as which it is habitually
depicted by anti-Communist propaganda. Nor is it the anti-imperialist
movement of the exploited masses which it ought to be if the canons of
Marxist-Leninist ideology were true. In actual fact the Communist parties
are mere pawns in the complicated Latin American political game. Time and
again they have been used and then cast aside by skillful politicos of
the right center and moderate left.
Chinese Relations with the Latin American
Communist Parties: 1956-1960
Chinese efforts to draw the Latin American Communists away from
the Soviet Union began as early as 1956. After the 20th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Latin American guest delegates
to that Congress were invited for a prolonged stay to China, where they
were received by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi.
The Brazilian guest delegate was Diogenes Arruda, at that time the
chief aide of party leader Luis Carlos Prestes and virtually in control
of the party machine. In his book 0 Retrato,21 Osvaldo Peralva, who had
been the Brazilian representative on the staff of the Cominform newspaper
"for a lasting peace, for a people's democracy," relates how he met Arruda
in Moscow in July 1956, after the latter's return from China.
"The fellow was delighted with China and full of resentment against
the Soviets," Peralva relates. "Like so many other delegates to the 20th
Congress, it was only in China that he had heard of the existence of
Khrushchev's secret speech and been told some of its salient points.
Angry about this and seeing that the situation was changing, Arruda de-
cided to change himself, and in a radical manner. . . . One afternoon,
stretched out on his hotel bed, cleaning his nails with a pen knife, Arruda
related to me his list of grievances against the Soviet bureaucrats. He
compared them unfavorably with the Chinese. Proudly he told me how he,
21 Rio de Janeiro, Editora Globo, 1962.
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together with the rest of the Latin American Communist delegation, had
been received by Mao Tse-tung, who had talked with them for two hours and
even asked whether they wanted to continue the conversation. In the Soviet
Union on the other hand, he said, he had never had the honor of being re-
ceived even by the most obscure member of the Central Committee."2 2
Arruda also informed Peralva about an off-the-record meeting between
the Latin American delegates and Liu Shao-chi, at which the latter had com-
plained of the insufficient Soviet aid to the Chinese Communist forces in
1945. After the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army by the Russians,
said Liu Shao-chi, "it would have been sufficient to leave the arms on
the ground to be picked up by the soldiers of the Chinese People's Libera-
tion Army. But instead of this, the Russians took even old rifles with
them in order not to leave them in our reach."
Working on the Cominform staff, Peralva had become aware of the
existence of Chinese-Soviet differences and rivalries long before 1956.
There was, for example, the fact that the Chinese Communist Party was not
a member of the Cominform. Peralva relates that after coming to power in
1949, the Chinese were officially asked to send a representative to that
organization, and that they never even replied to the invitation. Peralva
24
gives the following reasons for their refusal: if they had joined the
Cominform, they would either have had to maintain their own ideological
22 0 Retrato, pp. 24-25-
2 Op. cit., p. 118.
24 O cit., p. 117.
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theses, thus inevitably occasioning violent clashes with the Soviets,
which at that time they still wanted to avoid; or they would have had to
acquiesce to the Soviet line, thus relinquishing their aspirations to
hegemony over the Communist parties of the semi-colonial countries.
The main ideological points at issue between Moscow and Peking
before 1956 were according to Peralva, (a) the problem of the patterns
of revolution, with the Russians insisting (at least until the summer of
1955) on the Russian October 1917 pattern as the only valid one for all
Communist parties; and (b) the problem of post-revolutionary development.
To the Russians, the Chinese formula of peaceful integration of the rural
and urban bourgeoisie in the socialist society smacked of Bukharinism.
Peralva gives a summary of a lecture on this subject which he had heard
in 1 9 5 4 while in Moscow for a course in indoctrination. The Soviet lec-
turer pointed out that the liquidation of the bourgeoisie by the "Chinese
comrades" in reality was anything but peaceful; he stated that in Shanghai
alone, in the first five years of the revolution, 80,000 counterrevolution-
aries were arrested, and thousands executed, and then described in detail
the methods of coercion employed in the campaign against "the five evils"
to force the capitalists into the "mixed enterprises.'25
The 20th Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union greatly
weakened Russian authority and in consequence enhanced Chinese prestige
among the Communist parties of Latin America as in other parts of the
world. Thus soon after the Congress, a group of Brazilian Communist party
cadres was sent to China for a six-month course of indoctrination.26
25
p. c0it., pp. 120ff.
26 p. cit., p. 120.
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The removal of Arruda and of the conservative group of Joao Amazonas,
Pedro Pomar and Mauricio Grabois from the Brazilian party leadership in
1957 was a setback for the Chinese, but their influence among the cadres
remained strong.
Blas Roca, the secretary general of the Cuban Communists (PSP,
Partido Socialista Popular) was another Latin American Communist leader
who visited China in 1956, when Soviet prestige in the international
Communist movement was at its nadir. Three years later, after Castro
had come to power in Cuba, Blas Roca publicly proclaimed his enthusiasm
for Mao in the pages of the party newspaper, H~oy. In an article entitled
"The Human Qualities of Mao Tse-tung," he hailed the Chinese leader as
"a true sage who has contributed to the development and enrichment of
Marxism-Leninism. Two other members of the Cuban Communist Politburo,
Juan Marinello and Anibal Escalante, and several other party representa-
tives visited China in 1959.
The secretary general of the Communist party of Chile, Luis Corvalan,
also visited Peking in 1959. Years later, in a plenary meeting of his
Central Committee in June 1965, he admitted that during his talks with
27 Hoy, Havana, September 4, 1959. For this and numerous other
details on the relations between Cubans, both Communist and Castroite,
and Red China, I am indebted to Dr. Andres Suarez' valuable study on
Castro and the Communists, shortly to be published by the M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
Chinese leaders, he had "noticed different appreciations of certain prob-
lems, as that of the Cold War, which the Chinese comrades considered as
having the virtue of stirring up the nations and contributing to their
political awakening. I also noted that the Peaceful Road did not enjoy
any sympathies with them." At the time he had assumed that "these dif-
ferent ways of looking at certain problems found their explanation in
isolation, an insufficient knowledge of the international scene, a
tendency to generalize their own experience."
This perception had not prevented Corvalan, on his return, from
using "certain Chinese formulas ("the East wind prevails over the West
wind," "imperialism is a paper tiger," etc.) without fully realizing
their significance. Furthermore, in my case, in a press interview given
precisely on the occasion of my return from China I praised Comrade Mac
Tse-tung in exaggerated terms."28 Nor did it prevent Corvalan from send-
ing Chilean Communists to China as "Spanish language teachers and liter-
ary specialists" on request of the Chinese Communist Party, a practice
that was not suspended until 1963.29
The Chinese thus had reason to be disappointed when in the 1960
Moscow Conference and later international Communist gatherings, the Latin
28 The text of Corvalan's self-criticism as quoted from the Chilean
Communist Party's ideological periodical Principios, September-October
1963, in the present writer's Nationalism and Communism in Chile
(Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp- 104-105.
29 
. cit., p. 104.
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Americans took a solidly pro-Soviet stand. Mere financial pressure is
not enough to explain this swing. In one way or the other, the Latin
American Communist parties are indubitably dependent on Soviet aid.
By 1960 the Chinese would doubtless have been willing to pay some subsidy
to any Latin American Communist party willing to come over to their side.
Since the parties concerned, with the exception of that of Chile, are
very small, the sums involved would not have been beyond Peking's limited
financial capacity.
The basic reason for the revival of Moscow's authority with the
Latin American Communists was of course the change in the international
situation that had occurred that very year.
303 Osvaldo Peralva gives th. following account of the means by
which the Russians financed the Brazilian Communist Party: (1) the
money of the Peace Prizes, which the recipients, if party members,
were obliged to hand over to the Party; (2) payments for the Brazilian
edition of the Cominform journal (until April 1956) which were far higher
than the actual expenses incurred; (3) payments for the organization of
Peace and other fellow-traveling congresses, also regularly higher than
the actual expenses incurred; (4) payments in money or gifts in kind to
the Brazilian Communist party delegates to various Soviet Party and other
congresses (O Retrato, pp. 262ff). There does not, on the other hand,
appear to have been any regular subsidy to the Communist party of
Brazil.
20
The Rise of Castroism
In February 1960, Anastas Mikoyan had come to Havana to sign a
commercial treaty with Castro's revolutionary government. In April of
that year the first shipment of Soviet aid arrived in Cuba. At the
end of June the refineries of Texaco, Shell, and Standard Oil, which had
refused to process Soviet oil, were confiscated. In July Khrushchev
declared the Soviet government's readiness to buy the sugar which had
been refused from the American quota, and that same month Castro announced
21the arrival of the first Soviet bloc arms in Cuba.
For a simply geographical reason, the Latin American Communist part-
ies had always played a very minor role in the international Communist
movement. Their countries were much too far from the Soviet Union for
the Red Army to come to the aid of a revolution; they had had no prospect
of maintaining themselves in power if ever they became strong enough to
seize it. Now for the first time, the Soviet Union was strong enough to
establish a base in Latin America, in open defiance of the dominant power
of the Hemisphere. It would have been sheer idiocy on the part of the
Latin American Communists to choose this moment for a break with the
Russians.
In addition to this, Soviet action in Cuba clearly made nonsense
of the Chinese accusation that the policy of "peaceful coexistence" was
one of capitulation to imperialism. This indeed may well be the main
They were Czechoslovak arms.
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reason why Khrushchev embarked on the Cuban adventure. By coming to the
assistance of a government of an underdeveloped country which was asserting
its independence against the United States, he was demonstrating the readi-
ness and ability of the Soviet Union to espouse the cause of "national
liberation" even in a far-away country in close proximity to the shores
of the arch-imperialists, the United States. What followed was unforeseen
and accepted with reluctance by the Soviets: Castro was not satisfied with
the status of a mere "national democratic ally" of the Communist bloc,
since this appeared to him to offer insufficient protection against his
American foe. He insisted on entry into the socialist camp. But even
22
after he proclaimed his revolution to be a socialist one it took him
two years to achieve official Soviet recognition of Cuba as a nation that
was "building socialism.
Already in 1960, Soviet support of Cuba greatly improved the position
of the Latin American Communist Parties not only in the international Com-
munist movement but also in their own countries. They were now the unoffi-
cial ambassadors of a great power which was able to make its weight felt
in the hemisphere, and for this reason they were regarded with a new respect
by the non-Communist governments. But apart from these advantages the Com-
munist parties were also presented with a new and serious problem: Hitherto
In his speech of April 16 on the eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion.
See Revolucion, Havana, April 17, 1961.
In the slogans for the Moscow May Day parade of 1963, published
in Pravda on April 8, 1963.
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these parties had virtually monopolized the position of the extreme Leftist
opposition in Latin America. Now this monopoly was challenged by the
Castroite groups which sprang up in a number of Latin American countries
as a consequence of developments in Cuba.
On July 26, 1960 Castro had called on the peoples of Latin America
to follow the Cuban example and rise against the imperialists and their
domestic lackeys.
Earlier that year the ideologist of the Cuban Revolution, Che
Guevara, had published his Guerrilla Warfare. In this book he formulated
the three basic theses of Castroite political theory:
"(1) The people in arms can win a war against the regular army.
(2) It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for revolution
exist; the insurrection any nucleus can create them.
(3) In the underdeveloped areas of the Americas the countryside
must be the basic terrain for the armed struggle. 35
In his speech of the July 26 celebrations of 1960, which was
staged in the Sierra Maestra, the mountain range which had been Castro's
stronghold in his two-year guerrilla struggle against the Batista dictator-
ship, Castro said: "Here face to face with the unconquerable mountain
range face to face with the Sierra Maestra we vow to continue making our
Fatherland the example which shall convert the Andes Mountain Range into
the Sierra Maestra of all the Americas." Revolucio'n, Havana, July 27,
1960.
Translated from Ernesto Guevara, La Guerra de Guerrillas (Havana:
Ediciones Minfar, 1960 [?]), p. 11. The published English translations of
Guevara's book are unfortunately inadequate.
Guevara also asserted that "the guerrilla fighter is above all an
agrarian revolutionary. He interprets the desire of the great peasant
masses to be masters of the land, masters of their means of production,
of their animals, of everything they have aspired to for many years.
And Guevara inveighs against those who "insist dogmatically on centering
the struggle of the masses in urban movements, completely overlooking
the immense participation of the rural population in the life of all the
underdeveloped countries of the Americas. The struggles of the organized
workers' masses are not to be despised, but we must realistically analyze
their possibilities in the difficult conditions of the armed struggle,
when the guarantees which adorn our constitution are suspended or ignored.
In these conditions, the workers' movements must operate clandestinely,
without arms, in illegality, and faced with enormous dangers. The situa-
tion in the countryside is not so difficult, for there the inhabitants are
supported by the armed guerrillas in localities out of reach of the re-
pressive forces.
At first glance, Guevara's position would appear to correspond to
that of the Chinese. He even invokes the example of Mao, albeit with
characteristic Latin American inexactitude: "Mao's China began as an
outbreak of workers' groups in the South which is defeated and nearly
annihilated. It establishes itself and begins its rise only after the
long march to Yenan when it bases itself on rural areas and bases its
program on agrarian reform.
56 Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 13.
38 Ibid., p. 16.
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On closer examination, however, one finds that Guevara's political
outlook is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism in both its Russian and
its Chinese interpretation. Lenin's central concept of the Party as the
vanguard of the proletariat and the leader of the revolutionary struggle
is missing from Guevara's book.
Guevara admits that the "civilian organization of the insurrectional
movement is very important."40
Nevertheless, for him the guerrilla band and not the "civilian
organization" is "the fighting vanguard of the people" 1 which carries
on the struggle; the urban masses, alerted by the civilian organizations,
merely throw their weight on the scales at the decisive moment.42
Marxist-Leninists hold that revolutionary action may only be begun
when the masses of the people are ready for it--the masses of the prole-
tariat, according to Lenin, or the masses of the peasantry, according to
Mao. In Guevara's opinion, on the other hand, "it is not necessary to
This alone is sufficient to disprove the persistent claims that
Guevara was "an agent of international communism" infiltrated into the
Castro movement in order to bring it under Soviet control. No trained
Communist would commit the dreadful sin of forgetting the leading role
of the Party. Besides, no factual evidence has so far been produced that
before the victory of the Cuban revolution, Guevara had ever been a member
of, or in any way associated with, a Communist party or one of its affili-
ated organizations. Guevara is a free-lance revolutionary of a specifically
Latin American type.
40 Guevara, op. cit., p. 116.
41 Ibid., p. 14.
42 Ibid., p. 123.
25
wait until all conditions for a revolution exist; the insurrectionary
nucleus can create them." Revolution can thus be started by a minute
group: "The minimum number with which it is possible to initiate a
guerrilla war can be mentioned. In my opinion, considering the inevitable
desertions and weaknesses, one must count with a base of 30 to 50 men;
this number is sufficient in any country of the hemisphere where the
conditions of good operational terrain, hunger for land, repeated viola-
tions of justice, etc., are fulfilled.
In 19th century France, Auguste Blanqui had advocated revolutionary
action by a small armed band which would seize the vital centers of com-
mand in the capital cities. Guevara advocates action by a small armed
band which is to establish itself in sparsely populated areas of the
countryside, gradually draw the peasant masses over to its side by
preaching the revolutionary redistribution of the land, and achieve final
victory by wearing out and demoralizing the regular army in a series of
guerrilla skirmishes. Guevara's concept might thus perhaps be classified
as "agrarian Blanquism," but this would only serve to obscure its originality
and its specifically Latin American character.
Guevara himself claimed that his theory of guerrilla warfare was
based on the practical experience of the two-year guerrilla struggle of
Castro and his followers against the Cuban dictator Batista. He may have
sincerely believed this, but in that case he was deluding himself. For
Castro's guerrilla campaign was patterned on the model of the Cuban inde-
pendence war initiated by Jose Marti in 1895.
43 Ibid., p. 160.
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Marti fought for a political aim--the liberation of Cuba from Spanish
colonial rule--which appealed to all classes of Cuban society; in the
same way Castro's stated aim--the restoration of the 1940 constitution
set aside by the dictator--was also of universal appeal, and he obtained
financial aid from such sources as the millionaire politico Prio Socarris,
representative firms of the tobacco, rum and construction industries and
indeed from sugar mill, plantation, and cattle ranch owners. Only towards
the end of the struggle did he issue an agrarian reform program.
The modesty of this program has since been explained by an
authoritative source as resulting from Castro's reluctance to alienate
the big foreign and domestic land owners and sugar industrialists. In
an article in the World Marxist Review, Vol. 8, No. 10, October 1965,
the Cuban Communist Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, at the time of this writing
still a Minister in Castro's cabinet, stated that "over considerable areas
in Oriente, and also in Las Villas province, the owners of sugar refineries
began paying taxes to the Rebel Army as the new revolutionary government.
Some of the latitundists sugar planters and cattle men offered the
revolutionary forces material aid in various forms. Under these circum-
stances it would have been a mistake to introduce an agrarian law which
would have dealt a direct blow at the local and foreign latitundists;
this would only have made them rally around Batista again and would
have disclosed the aim of the revolution to imperialism before power
had been won."
Besides giving a highly romanticized, incorrect interpretation
of the Cuban guerrilla war, Guevara in his book would appear to have
greatly overestimated the revolutionary potential of the Latin
American peasantry. Since 1959, attempts to launch a guerrilla war
27
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have failed in Argentina, Paraguay, Santo Domingo, Ecuador, and Peru.
In Venezuela guerrillas maintain themselves in some mountain regions
with only the scantiest peasant support. In Colombia peasant support
for the guerrillas is confined to certain restricted areas in which
the Communists established themselves during the civil war of the early
1950's. The only country where the guerrillas enjoy the support of an
appreciable part of the peasant population is Guatemala, where the
ground was prepared by the agrarian reform of President Arbenz in 1953-
1954 and the subsequent revocation of this reform by the counterrevolutionary
government of Col. Castillo Armas.
The Social Origin of the Castroite Groups
The Latin American peasants failure to respond to the Castroite
call to arms is probably due to the industrialization process in the
cities. The most energetic members of the peasantry and rural proletariat--
those most likely to resort to revolutionary action--are constantly being
syphoned off to the shanty towns which ring the big cities. Conditions in
these slums may appear intolerable to foreign tourists, but they are
considerably better than in the rural areas; there is the possibility of
employment in factories, construction, services and household work.
Sociological field studies have established that the political views of
the average shanty town dweller are not revo lutionary.5 Recent election
413ee Regis Debray's articles, 'Le castrisme, la longue marche de
l'amerique latine," in Les Temps Modernes, Paris, No. 224, January 1965
and "America latina: algunas problemas de estrategia revolucionaria" in
Casa de las americas, Havana, July-August 1965.
45/,rank Bonilla, in his study of the shanty town dwellers of Rio
de Janeiro, "Rio's Favelas," American Universities Field Staff reports
service, East Coast .outh American Series, Vol. V111, No. 3 1961, comes
to the following conclusions:
"Thus the faveloado, however unrealistically, does not feel hopelessly
trapped in the favela. He sees the chances for escape of his children as
good. But the apparent faith in the possibilities for economic and social
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results in a number of Latin American countries have borne out these
findings.
All this may of course change quite rapidly if the pace of industriali-
zation slows down sufficiently to block the road of escape to the cities,
and to create mass unemployment in the shanty towns. At least one Latin
American country, and the largest one at that, -- Brazil -- appears to be
in some danger of this. But as of this writing, Castro still holds no
appeal to the rural masses and the urban sub-proletariat of unskilled
workers.
The social base of the small but extremely active Castroite movements
is to be found elsewhere: in the universities. Few of the detailed socio-
logical surveys of the Latin American student population have yet been
made public. It may however be stated as a fact that student elections
invariably show the extreme left--in which Castroism is today the dominant
trend--to be considerably stronger in the state universities, where tuition
is free or inexpensive, than in the private universities frequented by the
sons and daughters of the wealthier sectors of the middle class.
Castroism is certainly not a mere movement for the financial
betterment of a certain stratum of the population. It is a totalitarian
movement of young middle-class and lower middle-class intellectuals aiming
advance is not matched by the belief in the potential benefits to come
through political actions. Nearly half of the favelados said there
is nothing to be gained by political activity . . . ; about the same
proportion of skilled workers said they attach little or no importance
to their political opinions and activities. Thus neither the skilled
worker nor the favelado is highly politicized; the skilled worker differs
politically from the favelado chiefly in his participation in an
organization (his union) that is set up to defend his interests."
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to supplant and annihilate the old established ruling political and
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economic oligarchies. And it is violently anti-American; the close
links between the domestic oligarchies and American business enterprises
have caused it to regard the United States as the mainstay of the prevailing
political and social system in Latin America.
The emergence of an alternative e'lite of middle class and lower middle
class intellectuals intent on the conquest of power by violent means is
nothing new or unusual. It has occurred in numerous countries, including
18th century France, Weimar Germany, and pre-revolutionary Russia and
China. These middle class revolutionaries do not, however, fit the
Marxist-Leninist concept of what a revolutionary should be. The only term
that correctly qualifies them from the Marxist-Leninist point of view is
that of petty-bourgeois adventurism." And while the Communists are not
adverse to occasional collaboration with middle class elements in general,
they distrust and despise these "adventurers" addicted to violence, and
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would not dream of following their lead and adopting their tactics.
Communists and Castroites
The conflict between Castroites and Latin American Communists arose
with the very birth of the Castroite movement and has continued unabated
to this day.
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As always in such cases, some sons and daughters of the ruling
oligarchy also fall under the spell of the movement.
Since Guevara's book was first published in 1960, the Castroites
have made certain ideological concessions to the Communists. Following
Castro's lead they have proclaimed their adherence to Marxism-Leninism.
And in the second declaration of Havana Castro conceded that "the peasantry
. . . requires the revolutionary and political leadership of the working
class and the revolutionary intellectuals." See the Second Declaration of
Havana, Leaflet, Havana, February 4, 1962. But in practice they have maintained
their own, separate organization, never submitting to the leadership of the
Communist parties and to their strategy of peaceful "mass struggle'.'
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In some countries, such as Chile, the Communists openly advocate
"the peaceful road to socialism." 4 In others, such as Colombia and PeruIt1
they admit the eventual inevitability of violent revolution but stress that
"the masses" are not yet "sufficiently mobilized" and the other conditions
for armed struggle as laid down by Lenin are not yet fulfilled.
Time and again in their debates with the Castroites, the Latin
American Communists have pointed to the three conditions which, according
to Lenin, must be fulfilled before "the decisive battle is at hand" and
revolution is indeed ripe." These are:
(1) All the class forces hostile to us have become
sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at loggerheads
with each other, have sufficiently weakened themselve' in
a struggle which is beyond their strength; . . . (2) all
the vacillating and unstable, intermediate elements-- the
petty bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois democrats, as
distinct from the bourgeoisie -- have sufficiently exposed
themselves in the eyes of the people, have sufficiently disgraced
themselves through their practical bankruptcy, and . . .
(3) among the proletariat, a mass sentiment favoring the most
determined, bold and dedicated revolutionary action against
the bourgeoisie has merged and begun to grow vigorously. Then
revolution is indeed ripe . . " 50
Guevara's assertion that "it is not necessary to wait until all
conditions for revolution exist; the insurrectionary nucleus can create
4 8See for instance, the articles by the party leader Luis Corvalan
in World Marxist Review, Vol. V. No. 12, December 1962 and World Marxist
Review, Vol. VI, No. 12, December 1963.
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See for instance the Colombia party leader Gilberto Vieira's article
in the World Marxist Review, Vol. VIII, No. 8, August 1965, and the Peruvian
party leader Jorge Del Prado's article in World Marxist Review, Vol. VII
No. 5, May 1964.
'Left-wing Communistm-- An Infantile Disorder," in V. I. Lenin,
Collected Works, Vol. 31, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1966, p. 94.
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them" is clearly in direct contradiction to Lenin's thesis.
It would be beyond the scope of this study to deal with the details
of the conflict between the Latin American Communists and the Castroites.
Suffice it to say that practically every Latin American contribution to the
World Marxist Review, the organ of the international Communist movement, from
1960 to this day, as well as many speeches by Fidel Castro, bear witness to
its existence. Even when the two groups are forced into an alliance by
circumstance, relations between them are invariably tense. The Communists
are, of course, greatly hampered in the debate by the fact that Castro is
an ally of the Soviet Union and can thus only be attacked indirectly, without
mentioning is name.
The Soviet attitude towards the conflict has been ambiguous. On the
one hand, Moscow has in general supported the Communist parties' line of
stressing the primary importance of what they euphemistically call *mass
struggle, i.e. peaceful trade union activity. On the other hand, the
Russians have tolerated Cuban encouragement of guerrilla activities on the
Latin American continent although it would certainly be in their power to
put an end to this. And since the summer of 1964 their support of "the
peaceful road" policy espoused by the majority of the Latin American
51Communist parties has weakened. At the Havana Tricontinental Conference
of January 1966, the Soviet representative Rashidov espoused the Castroite
line of armed struggle. 52
5 1For this see Herbert Dinerstein, Soviet Policy in Latin America,
Memorandum RM 4967, Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, May 1966.
52
According to the Tass International Service of January 6, 1966,
Rashidov stated 'that the Soviet people supported peoples' wars, and the
struggle of oppressed peoples for freedom and independence."
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Peking and the Castroites
But what of the Chinese position? One would have expected Peking eagerly
to take the side of the Castroites. In March 1960 a Chinese-Latin American
friendship association was founded in Peking in the following years, a
constant stream of visitors from Latin America came to China under the
auspices of the Association. They ranged from representative figures rof
Latin American political life such as Mexican ex-President Portes Gil 5nd
Brazilian Vice President Joo Goulart to fellow-traveling student dlelegations
and groups of "cultural workers". Among them there were doubtless many
Castroites. Some of these may even have stayed in China for military training.
But there is no evidence of large-scale Chinese military or financial aid to
the Castroite movements of Latin America, nor of the establishment of
organizational links with them. In other words: the Chinese refrained from
any serious effort to bring the Castroite "national democratic revolutionaries"
under their control, as they have attempted to do, with some measure of success,
with the extremist wing of nationalist movement in Africa.
To the best of their limited abilities, the Chinese have competed with
the Russians in giving economic aid to Cuba, a field in which they could not
hope to be victorious. Diplomatic relations between China and Cuba were
established in September 1960. But as we have seen Peking was tardy in
recognizing the socialist nature of the Cuban revolution and admitting Cuba
to the ranks of the nations which are "building socialism"
53 See Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press, No. 2222, March 23, 1960. 4
5teking Review. Vol. IT, No. 43, October 25, 1960.
5 5Peking Review, Vol. IV, No. 34, August 25, 1961.
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In September 1961, 5 months after Castro had solemnly proclaimed the
socialist nature of the Cuban revolution, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos
arrived in Peking on an official visit. At the airport he greeted Liu
Shao-Chi with the words "Comrade President Liu' and in his turn was welcomed
by the latter with the words that Cuba was "the first Latin American country
which has fully accomplished its national democratic revolution," a statement
that constituted a rebuff to the Cuban regime's desire to be recognized as
socialist. Three days later, at a celebration in honor of the Cuban guests,
Dorticos spelled out that "Comrade Fidel Castro has proclaimed the socialist
nature of our revolution."57 The communique issued on the occasion of the
visit admitted that "the heroic Cuban people, under the able leadership of
the revolutionary government headed by Prime Minister Fidel Castro, has
chosen the part of socialist development,5 8 -- an intermediate formula
similar to that used by the Russians until 1963, and not yet admitting that
Cuba was actually engaged in "building socialism." In his farewell speech
Liu Shao-Chi addressed his Cuban guest as "His Excellency President Dorticos"
and mentioned Castro as "His Excellency Prime Minister Fidel Castro,'59 while
Dorticos, in his final words, obliquely insulted the Chinese by stating that
he attributed the vigor of Sino-Cuban friendship to "the friendly and
cordial stimulus provided by the Soviet Union.
56NCNA, September 23, in SCMP, No. 2588. These and the following
quotations from the NCNA bulleti s and the newspaper Hoy, Havana, are
given as reproduced in Dr. Andres Su'rez' above-mentioned manuscript.
57NCNA, September 25, in SCM? 2590.
Hoy, Havana, October 3, 1961.
59 NCNA, October 2,in SCMP 2594.
6oIdem.
Peking had been unsparing in its words of praise for the Cuban
Revolution and its assurances that 650 million Chinese were willing to
aid and protect the heroic Cuban people. But on this one occasion when
Peking could have rendered Castro a tangible political service b;y backing
his demand to be received into the "socialist camp" it failed to give him
adequate support. This may well have been decisive in determining Castro's
unenthusiastic attitude towards China. Castro's position on such important
issues as "peaceful coexistence" and violent revolution is akin to that
of Peking and not of Moscow, and he has refused to sign the test-ban treatyr.
Yet for years he was vociferous in praise of Khrushchev while avoiding ever
to mention Mao or any other Chinese leader in his speeches. He has skillfully
exploited the Sino-Soviet split to extort concessions from the Russians
without ever wholly committing himself to their side, and this apparently
is the main function of China in his scheme of things.
The Chinese were also tardy in giving full ideological support
to the Cuban doctrine of revolution by guerrilla warfare. In February 1962
Castro issued the second declaration of Havana 61 which called for a
guerrilla war of continental dimensions. The declaration included one
concession to Marxist-Leninist doctrine:
But the peasantry is a class which because of the
ignorance in which it has been kept and the isolation
in which it lives, requires the revolutionary and
political leadership of the working class and the
revolutionary intellectuals. Without that it cannot
alone launch the struggle and achieve the victory.6 2
But this did not mean acceptance of the leading role of the Communist
parties, nor acceptance of their current moderate policies. The declaration
6 lThe second declaration of Havana, leaflet, Havana, February 1962.
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made this evident in an admonishment clearly aimed at these parties:
The duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution.
We know that in America and throughout the world the
revolution will be victorious. But revolutionaries cannot
sit in the doorway of their homes to watch the corpse of
imperialism pass by. The role of Job does not behoove a
revolutionary.
Peking hailed the declaration of Havana with apparent enthusiasm.
There were newspaper reports and editorials, messages in support of the
declaration by "Chinese literary and art circles" and "Chinese jurists,
and even a mass rally in Peking to acclaim the declaration. At the rally,
Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Ch,'en Yi declared that 'the Chinese
"63
government and people warmly welcome and firmly support this declaration.
But on examination of the key People's Daily editorial, one is struck by
its extraordinary distortion of the meaning of the declaration. The word
"armed struggle" is only mentioned once in the article; the fact that the
declaration calls for a guerrilla struggle based on the broad masses of
the peasantry is completely suppressed, and the declaration is presented
as being, in essence, an appeal for the formation of 'the broadest possible
national democratic united front.
Havana of course also postulates a "united front" but there is a
marked difference between Chinese and Cuban opinion as to how broad this
united front should actually be. The People's Daily quotes the Havana
Declaration statement according to which the anti-imperialist and anti-
feudal struggle unites "the working class, the peasantry, the working
intellectuals, the petty bourgeoisie and the more progressive sections
63See SCMP February 3, 8, 10, 12, 15, 19, 1962.
6 4As reproduced in Peking Review Vol. V, No. 7, February 16, 1962.
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of the national bourgeoisie. " 65 But in direct juxtaposition with this
the People's Daily gives its own formula which includes the entire "Tnational
bourgeoisie", not only its "more progressive sections."
Workers, peasants, intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie
and national bourgeoisie--all have had their fill of
enslavement, exploitation and oppression by U.S.
imperialism and its lackeys. It is therefore not only
necessary but also entirely possible for these classes
and strata to line up in the broadest national democratic
front against their enemies."
In view of the fact that they themselves had come to power through
20 years of rural guerrilla struggle, the Chinese communists' failure to
mention, let alone to applaud the Cuban formula of revolution by peasant
guerrilla war was indeed remarkable. Peking Review tried to make up for
66this omission by publishing, in its issue of April 27, 1962 an article
"Latin American Peasants on the March." But this article also fell far
short of an endorsement of the Cuban thesis. It dealt mainly with peasant
seizures of land in various Latin American countries. Guerrilla war with
the political aim of overthrowing the government was only briefly mentioned
at the end. And the article ended with an alleged quotation from the
Havana Declaration which was apocryphal and surely constituted a
deliberate distortion of the Declaration's message:
the Second Havana Declaration has pointed out that
the peasantry in Latin America is 'a potentially
strong force which will have decisive significance
in the struggle for national liberation so long as
it is led by the workers and intellectuals'"
65Actually the People's Daily translation is incorrect. The
text of the declaration reads: "Los sectores mas progresistas..."
This is the superlative, i.e. the most progressive sectors, and
it is indeed rendered in this form in the official translation of
the declaration.
6 6Peking Review, Vol. V, No. 17.
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On September 17, the Chinese government issued the statement
which at long last recognized the socialist' nature of the Cuban
revolution. 6  This move would appear to have been prompted by Peking's
desire to curry Cuba's favor at the time when the Russians were actually
installing missile bases on the island. But mere words do not offset
nuclear warheads. In Autumn 1962 the gesture which one year earlier
would have been of considerable value to Castro, was an empty one.
Then came the missile crisis, in which Soviet prestige received
a shattering blow.
After the Missile Crisis
The long-term effect of the missile crisis was a considerable loss of
momentum for the revolutionary Left of Latin America, for it now transpired
that the Soviets were not, after all, strong enough to defy the United
S-ta in that area and to afford effective protection to a Latin American
revolution, but would back down in a confrontation. There was thus little
prospect that the Cuban experience could be repeated in another country.
The decline in prospects for a revolution negatively effected the
entire Latin American extreme Left including the pro-Chinese sector. But
within this general development several factors favored Peking at the
expense of Moscow. These were:
1. A severe crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations. Castro openly
protested against the withdrawal of the missiles and ridiculed Khrushchev's
claims to have saved Cuba by forcing Kennedy to give a promise of
nonaggression. At the East German Party Congress in January 1963,
Castro had himself represented by Armando Hart, a member of the 26th
of July Movement and not of the old established Cuban Communist Party
6 7See Peking Review, Vol. V. No. 39, September 28, 1962.
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PSP. Hart refused to join in the condemnation of China's ally Albania
voiced by the Chilean guest delegate Orlando Millas in the name of most of
the Latin American Communist parties. At previous European party congresses
Cuba had always been represented by an "old guard" Communist (Blas Roca)
who spoke out against Albania in accordance with the Soviet line. Castro's
visit to the Soviet Union in April-May 1963 brought about a brief reconcili-
ation, but the rift was soon opened anew by his refusal to sign the test-
ban treaty.
2. A temporary increase in the militancy of the Castroite groups. At
the time of the missile crisis, the Venezuelan Castroites launched a campaign
of terrorism and guerrilla warfare in "defense of Cuba." The Communist Party
allowed itself to be dragged into this venture, and a joint command of the
"farmed forces of liberation" (FALN) was set up. Through this, a radical
pro-Castro wing gained control of the Venezuelan Communist Party and led it
out of the Soviet orbit.69 In Guatemala the Communists also rashly joined
in an alliance with the Castroites, a step which they were later greatly
to regret. 7 1
3. Meanwhile the leaders of most Latin American Communist Parties have
drawn the correct conclusion from the missile crisis, namely that revolution
was postponed indefinitely and that it was time to reaffirm their
6 8See Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 100.
69For a--widely exaggerated--account of the initial successes of the
Venezuelan guerrilla campaign, See Yen Erh Wen,"Armed Struggle Flames in
Venezuela," in Peking Review, Vol. VI, No. 13, March 29, 1963.
70The PTG, Partido Guatemalteco Bel Trabajo
71See the Guatemalan party statement in World Marxist Review Vol. VIII,
No. 4, April 1965.
39
accustomed policies of moderation.72 This led to an increase of tension
inside the parties, and in some cases to the emergence of a radical, pro-
Chinese wing.
4. Widespread disillusionment with the Soviet Union in those sectors
of the non-Communist Latin American Left which had adopted a pro-Soviet
attitude as a result of Moscow's policy of support of Cuba. Many of these
Leftists, including the Castroite groups in Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru and
other countries and a sector of the Chilean Socialists now developed strong
sympathies for China.
Peking was thus encouraged to intensify its efforts in Latin America.
From March 1963 onward a Spanish language edition of Peking Review was
published under the name of Pekin Informa. Its distribution in Latin
America was handled by a firm, Espartaco Editores Ltda, set up for this
purpose in Santiago de Chile and operated by a small group of pro-Chinese
members of the Chilean Communist Party, the Spartacus group, who were
expelled from the party later that year.7 3
The appearance of Pekin Informa on the newsstands of Santiago de
Chile, Lima, Caracas, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, Buenos Aires
and other Latin American cities had instant repercussions in the Latin
American Left. The pro-Soviet Communist Party leaderships were now forced
to declare themselves openly to their own memberships and to the general
public of their countries. They had been perfectly aware of the significance
of the Sino-Soviet conflict as early as 1960 at the very least. 74
72 In the 1963 presidential elections in Peru the Communists, who had
put up a radical candidate of their own in the previous election, supported
the moderate candidate Belaunde Terry; in Argentina the Communists broke with
their Peronista allies in order to give qualified support to President Illia,
also a moderate. For this see Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile,
pp. 85-86.
73See Ibid., pp. 94ff.
A4See, for instance, the highly revealing report to the Chilean Central
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Tiit they had kept discussion of the matter on a Central Committee level, while
publicly denying the existence of the conflict or presenting it as a matter
of no significance and avoiding all public condemnation of the Chinese.
Now this was no longer possible. Already at the end of March the largest
and most powerful of the Latin American Communist Parties, the Communist
Party of Chile, felt it necessary to warn its membership against the
ostensibly Marxist-Leninist documents attacking the international
.75
communist movement as well as several brother parties." In June 1963
a central committee meeting was called to hear a speech by Secretary General
Luis Corvalan on "the differences with the Chinese comrades" and contrary
to previous practice the text of this was published in the party press and
later as a separate pamphlet. On September 29, a Communist sponsored
public meeting in a Santiago park heard a savage attack on Peking by Pablo
Neruda who besides being Latin America's foremost poet is a member of the
Chilean Politburo. In his speech, which was obviously intended for a larger
public than just a Chilean one, Neruda said:
It seems to me that the Chinese errors in their violent
internal and foreign policies stem from one sole fount: the
cult of personality, internally and externally. We who have
visited China have seen the case of Stalin repeated. Every street,
every door, has a portrait of Mao Tse-tung. Mao Tse-tung has
become a living Buddha, separate from the people by a priestly
court that interprets in its own manner Marxism and the story
Committee on the Moscow 1960 Conference of 81 communist
parties by the Chilean delegate Jose Gonzalez, quoted in
Halperin, op. cit. pp. 68ff. Excerpts from this secret report
were published by the Chilean Communist Party in 1964.
75Quoted from Halperin, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
See Halperin, op. cit., p. 102.
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of our times. The peasants were obliged to bow, to genuflect
before the picture of the leader. Recently Comrade Chou En-lai
publicly congratulated a young Chinese because he had had
himself sterilized voluntarily in order to serve the cause
of the Chinese Republic. . . .'This event has given the entire
world an excellent example, especially since it is the husband
who took the initiative. This example should be a great example
to emulate,' declared Chou En-lai.
It naturally occurs to us that if Comrade Chou En-lai's
father had had this idea Chou En-lai would not exist. Is this
Communism? It is rather a cult, ridiculous, superstitious,
unacceptable.
Comrades, every railroad, every biidge, every factory, every
airplane, every modern road, every agricultural cooperative in
China was built by Soviet engineers and technicians. When I was
there and spent some days at a resort on the Yellow Sea, 2,000
Soviet technicians generously lent by the socialist state were
resting in one single hotel.
And this state is accused by the Chinese leaders of not
assisting the growing forces of socialism. Those who owe
everything are accusing those who gave everything.
These leaders are sending letters to every intellectual in
Latin America, inciting them to collaborate in the division of
the socialist world. This incitement may lead to many errors
and help to weaken the national liberation front.
But the personality cult in China itself leads to the same
tragic occurrences as in the past. Speaking only of those whom
I know personally among my Chinese writer comrades, I will tell
you that the foremost Chinese novelist, Lenin prize, ex-president
of the Union of Chinese Writers, Ting Ling, has disappeared.
First she was condemned to wash dishes and sleep on the ground
in a far away peasant's commune. Then we did not hear of her again.
I knew her very well because she was president of the committee
nominated by the ministry of culture to receive Ilya Ehrenburg
and me when we traveled to Peking in order to hand the peace
prize to Sung Ch'ing-ling, Mrs. Sun Yat-sen. Why was she
sentenced? They found out that 25 years ago she had had a love
affair with a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek. Yes, this was true,
but they did not say that the great writer, with her child in
her arms, barefoot, and with a rifle on her shoulder, made the
entire long march from Yenan to Nanking with the guerrillas of
the Chinese Communist Party.
And the poet Ai Ch'ing, whom we all know in Chile, the best
poet in China, an old Communist, who visited Chile on the
occasion of my 50th birthday, where is he? Accused of being a
rightest because he knows the French language, and for other
ridiculous accusations, he has been banished to the Gobi Desert,
to an inhuman altitude, and forced to sign his poems with another
name. That is, he has been morally executed.
The Chinese leader who gave me this information smiled
with an icy smile.7 7
77
Quoted from Halperin, op. cit., pp. 111-112.
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At the same meeting Secretary General Luis Corvalan declared:
"There is no danger of a split in the party. They will not be able to split
one single cell, one single one of our 3,000 basic organizations." This
was true. The Communist Party, composed mainly of workers, showed little
interest in the ideological diatribes of Peking Review. The Communists'
allies in the People's Action Front (FRAP) alliance, on the other hand,--
Socialists, independent leftists, and even the representatives of the
left wing of the non-Marxist Radical Party-- were greatly attracted by
the Chinese line. A Communist ultimatum was necessary to prevent a number
of the most prominent socialist and independent leftist personalities of
the FRAP alliance from attending a meeting, sponsored by the Spartacus
group, in celebration of the 14th anniversary of the victory of the
Chinese Revolution.79
At this stage Chinese propaganda was equally or even more
effective in other Latin American countries. It seemed not only more
in keeping with Lenin's teachings but also quite simply more coherent,
logical and intelligent than the Soviet ideologists' muddled and long-
winded attempts to explain away the difference between the interests
of the Soviet state and those of world revolution. Chinese propaganda
was by no means limited to demands for Marxist-Leninist ideological
orthodoxy; it cleverly exploited the Cuban missile crisis to refute the
charge that China wanted to plunge the world into a nuclear holocaust.
The Chinese government declaration of September 1, 1963 pointed out that
it was the Soviet government--not the United States--which was responsible
for the development of the situation in the Caribbean into a nuclear crisis:
78Quoted from Halperin, op. it,, p. 110.
79See Ibid., pp. 10-ff.
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The Soviet leaders never weary of asserting that
there was a thermonuclear war crisis in the Caribbean
Sea which was averted only because the Soviet leaders
firmly pursued the policy of peaceful coexistence.
But the facts are there for everyone to see. Although
the tension in the Caribbean Sea stemmed from the U. S.
imperialist policy of aggression in Cuba and although
there has been a continuing danger of an invasion of
Cuba by the U. S. imperialists, nevertheless, before
the Soviet Union sent rockets into Cuba, there did not
exist a crisis of the United States using nuclear weapons
in the Caribbean Sea and of a nuclear war breaking out. If
it should be said that such a crisis did arise, it was a
result of the rash action of the Soviet leaders.
The Soviet leaders slanderously accused China of having
hoped for a head-on clash between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The question is, did we ask you to transport
rockets to Cuba? The label of adventurism cannot be
pinned on us. If the Marxist-Leninist line we always follow
had been acted on, there would never have been a question of
shipping rockets to Cuba and the so-called nuclear war crisis
would never have existed. How could the question of adven-
turism have then arisen?
We should like to ask the Soviet leaders, since the
transport of rockets to Cuba was a matter of such great
importance, did you ever consult the Soviet people, or the
other socialist countries, or the working class in capitalist
countries about it? Without consulting anybody you willfully
embarked on a reckless course and irresponsibly played with
the lives of millions upon millions of people. The errors
were of your own making, and so what ground is there for
you to blame others?
There is no need whatsoever to transport rockets to
Cuba in order to support the Cuban revolution. That was
what the Soviet leaders said in the past, and it is also
what they are saying now, and in very beautiful language.
For instance, the Open Letter of July 14 of the Central
Committee of the CPSU's said that 'in case of aggression by
American imperialists, we shall come to the assistance of the
Cuban people from Soviet territory, just as we would have
helped them from Cuban territory. True, in this case the
rockets would take slightly longer in the flight, but their
accuracy would not be impaired by this.' That being so,
why did you have to ship rockets to Cuba? Was your purpose
really to defend the Cuban Revolution? Would it not be more
correct to say that what you did in the name of defending
the Cuban revolution was in reality political gambling?
Anyone with common sense will ask: Since the rockets
were introduced, why did they have to be withdrawn
afterwards? And inasmuch as the rockets were withdrawn
afterwards, why did they have to be introduced before? . . .
The Soviet leaders have said that China was opposed to
the withdrawal of the rockets from Cuba and to the efforts
of the Soviet Union to avert a nuclear war. This is a
completely groundless statement. As we were totally
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opposed to your sending rockets in, why should we
oppose the withdrawal? It is understandable you should
have tried to extricate yourselves from difficulties of
your own creation. But we were resolutely opposed to
your acceptance of the completely unjustifiable ard 80humiliating terms which the U. S. imperialists advanced.
The Chinese Communists "Proposal Concerning the General Line of
the International Communist Movement was another document which met
with a very favorable reception in the Latin American non-Communist
left. The statement: "If the leading group in any party adopt a non-
revolutionary line and convert it into a reformist party, then Marxist-
Leninists inside and outside the Party will replace them and lead the
people in making revolution,",1 was obviously a salute to Fidel Castro,
a belated recognition that he had been a true Marxist-Leninist in making
the Cuban revolution while the Cuban Communist leaders had fallen into
the mire of reformism. And it also seemed to open vistas towards a Pekin-
inspired greater revolutionary movement open to all those Leftists
who had refused to submit to the mental shackles of Communist Party
discipline. These hopes were strengthened when in January 1964, Peking
Review reprinted an article on guerrilla warfare by Che Guevara which
had originally appeared in a Cuban periodical. In this article, Guevara
made only superficial concessions to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. He quoted
the passage from the Havana Declaration in which the need for "leadership
of the working class and the revolutionary intellectuals" was stressed,
and he insisted that 'the leading Marxist-Leninist party" must be
"capable of mobilizing the masses to the greatest extent possible, and
leading them to the correct path of solving the fundamental contradictions."
80Quoted from Griffith, op. cit., pp. 382-384.
8 Quoted from I p. 270.
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But he made it clear that this "correct path" in Latin America was
guerrilla warfare, and then went on to reaffirm his own concept of a
revolution in which the guerrilla army, and not the Party, was the
striking force. He further mentioned the Party only in order to criticize
and admonish the Communists:
The only thing history does not permit is that the
analysts and the executors of proletarian policies make
mistakes of judgment. To qualify for the role of vanguard
political party is not like qualifying for a university
diploma. Such a party must lead the working class in the
struggle for state power and know how to guide it to seize
power, leading the struggle to the quickest victory.
Nothing more about the Party was said in the article; nothing about how
it should exert its leadership in actual practice, nothing about its
relationship to the guerrilla army and the guerrilla command.
Guevara also acknowledged that objective and subjective conditions
had to be right in order to make revolution. But this also was a merely
verbal concesssion: he claimed that:
there exist everywhere in this continent the objective
conditions which comnel the masses to oppose the government
of the bourgeoisie and the landlords by violent acts, and
that many other countries face a government crisis and there
the subjective conditions are present, too.
The revolutionary struggle in Latin America would therefore sooner or
later take on -a continental character."
The article implicitly rejected, a concept dear to the Chinese,
namely that of the "national democratic" revolution in which the
"national bourgeoisie" would side with the revolutionaries: "There is
a complete polarization of the various forces, with the exploiters on one
extreme and the exploited on the other. . . ." And:
The majority of the national bourgeoisie are in league
with U.S. imperialism and want to throw in their lot with
it in every country. . . . The polarization of the hostile
class forces is far more rapid than the development of the
contradictions among the exploiters in the division of spoils.
Hence the revolution would pass into its socialist stage immediately
46
after its military victory:
...the phenomenon of polarization of forces which is
appearing in America and the clear division between the
exploiters and the exploited in the future revolutionary
wars indicate that once the armed vanguard of the people
rises to seize state power, the country or countries where
state power has been seized will eliminate the oppressors,
both imperialists and domestic exploiters, at the same time.
The first stage of the socialist revolution will be realized;
the people will set out, o heal the wounds and embark on
socialist construction.
The Guevara article was clearly unorthodox not only from the
Russian but also from the Chinese point of view. The publication of this
heretical document in Peking Review, a journal dedicated to the
propagation of the ideology of Maoism, was a most unusual concession
to the Cubans. It seemed to augur a period of close cooperation between
the Chinese and the Castroite movement on a continental scale. In view
of the looseness of the ties between Cuba and the Castroite groups on
the continent, and of Castro's own success in maintaining his freedom
of movement in spite of his material dependence on Soviet aid, such
collaboration seemed entirely feasible.
The Formation of Chinese Splinter Parties
The Chinese, however, had decided otherwise. Peking did not take
advantage of the strong pro-Chinese sentiment of the Latin American
Castroites by establishing ties with these groups. In publishing the
Guevara article, Peking apparently merely intended to embarrass the
Latin American Communist parties by creating the erroneous impression
that an alliance with the Castroites was in being or about to be formed.
This also seems to have been the purpose of a letter by the Chinese
Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Chilean Communists,
stating:
82Quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 2, January 10, 1964.
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In Latin America the 'peaceful way' which you
advocate stands in sharp contrast to the revolutionary
way of Fidel Castr 3and other comrades who led the Cuban
people to victory.
In actual fact Peking persisted in concentrating its attention on
the Latin American Communist Parties. Its attempt to draw entire Parties
away from the Soviet Union had failed. In accordance with its worldwide
policy, it now proceeded to split the Communist movement in Latin America
by setting up rival Parties.
One such pro-Chinese splinter Party had in fact come into being much
earlier. In February 1962 a group of functionaries expelled from the
Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro, PCB) had founded
the rival Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil, PCdoB).8 4
Osvaldo Peralva's honest and remarkably reliable book, 0 Retrato, contains
valuable information on the events leading to the split and on the
personalities of the leaders of the new party.
According to Peralva the Brazilian Communist Party had been plunged
into a severe crisis by the events of the year 1956. In the first half
of 1957 the Stalinist leadership group of Diogenes Arruda, Joao Amazonas,
Mauricio Grabois and Pedro Pomar had defeated the revisionist opposition
factions of Agildo Barata and Osvaldo Peralva. But later that year the
secretary general of the party, Luis Carlos Prestes, who had hitherto
left the management of party affairs to Arruda and Amazonas, emerged
83The date of this letter is not known. The above passage was
quoted by Luis Corvalan in an article in World Marxist Review, Vol. V,
December 1964.
84A resolution of this party of August 1964, quoted in Peking
Review, Vol VIII, No. 22, May 28, 1965, says that the Communist Party
of Brazil "was rebuilt in February 1962." A Prensa Latina (Havana)
dispatch from Montevideo, dated March 114, 1962 reports that the
founding convention of the party was held in Sao Paulo.
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from retirement to remove the Stalinists from their positions and to
replace them by a new "centrist" leadership. The Stalinist group had,
however, been in control of the party machine since the 1940's,85 and
their influence remained strong even after their fall from power. Amazonas,
Grabois and Pomar were finally expelled from the party in 1961 after the
return of Prestes from Moscow, where he had attended the 22nd Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They thereupon formed their own
splinter Party, set up a publishing house, brought out a Brazilian transla-
tion of Che Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare and founded a fortnightly news-
paper A Classe Operaria. They apparently received both Chinese and Cuban
funds for these undertakings. 8 7
Peralva relates that in the long period during which the Stalinist
group was in factual control of the Prestes party, it had assiduously
cultivated the old anti-intellectualist tradition of the Brazilian
Communists. 8 8 Peralva gives numerous instances of the humiliations which
the Stalinist leadership inflicted on prominent intellectuals who had
been drawn into the party's orbit by the magic name of Prestes. 89
8 5Arruda had taken over the factual leadership of the party as early
as 1940. See Peralva, O Retrato, pp. 203--204.
8 6The most dynamic of the Stalinists and the only one of them with
real leadership qualities, Diogenes Arruda, had retired from political
activity and refrained from joining the splinter party.
87According to an East European diplomatic source in Havana, whose
identity I am not at liberty to disclose, Luis Carlos Prestes, during his
visit to Cuba in March 1963, managed to persuade the Cubans to stop their
subsidies, thus making the dissident Party dependent on Chinese aid alone.
8 8 For this tradition see also Jorge Amado's three-volume novel,
Os Subterraneos da Liberdade, 10th ed., Sgo Paulo, Livraria Martins, 1964.
At the time when he wrote this novel, Amado was a fervent and disciplined
Communist, who accepted tie aonstant slights and insults aimed it the
intellectuals by the party leadership in a spirit of contrition, apparently
regarding them as entirely justified.
8 9Through his milittary exploits at the head of a column of insurgents
from 1925 to 1927 Prestes had become a legendary figure and one of the
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To this day tie influence of the Communist Party and of Marxist-
Leninist doctrine on intellectual circles is greater in Brazil than in any
other Latin American country, and perhaps than in a number of Iron Curtain
countries.90 By failing to exploit this advantage, and repelling many
intellectuals who were attracted to communism, the Stalinist bosses of
the Communist Party machine doubtless contributed greatly to the rapid
decline of the Party from the position it had reached in 1945, when it laid
claim to a membership of 200,000 and for a brief period was a force to be
reckoned with in Brazilian politics.
It was thus the most sterile, rigid and ineffective elements in the
Brazilian communist movement who were won over to the Chinese cause.
The pro-Chinese Communist Party of Brazil came into being at a time
when Peking had not yet decided to split the Communist parties on an
international scale. The foundation of the new Party was not reported
by the Chinese press. In M4arch 19(3, a two-man delegation of the new Party
arrived in Peking; 3 weeks later, they were received by Iao Tse-tung.91
But in the English version of Peking Review, which may be considered Peking's
great names of Brazilian history years before he became a Communist.
noFor this, see Fernando Pereira: 31 Margo, Civis E Militares No
Processo Da Crisis Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro, Jose Alvaro, Editor, 1964,
pp. 167-179. A striking example of this influence is the latest book by
Brazil's leading economic historian, Caio Prado Junior, A Revoluq'Ko Brasileia.,
Sao Paulo, Editora Brasilense, 1966. In this book, Caio Prado, himself
a rigid Marxist, devotes an entire chapter of 82 pages to a detailed
analysis and criticism of certain theses contained in the 1928 program
of the Comintern, a 1933 declaration by the South American Bureau of the
Comintern, the 1954 program of the Brazilian Communist Party and other
Party documents. In what other country do leading intellectuals take old
Communist party programs so seriously? And even the works of authors like
Celso Furtado and helio Jaguaribe, whom it would be asinine to regard
as Communists, abound in terms lifted from Communist party leaflets,
which these writers treat with the respect due to accepted scientific
categories.
91
"See Peking Review, Vol. VI, No. lh, April 5, 6, 17, 26, 196h3.
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official organ as far as Chinese activities in the international
communist movement are concerned, they were described as a delegation
of the "Brazilian Communist Party", thus omitting the official name
of the Party, "Communist Party of Brazil."
On August 24, 1963, the Albanian newspaper Zeri i Popullit
published the full text of an anti-Soviet resolution passed by the
Communist Party of Brazil, excerpts from which were also circulated
by the New China News Agency. But it is significant that the resolution
was not published by Peking Review. An article by one of the leaders of
the splinter Party, Mauricio Grabois, which had originally appeared in
A Classe Operaria, was reprinted in Peking Review, Vol. VI, No. 35,
August 30, 1963, but neither the author nor the newspaper were
identified as being of the Communist Party of Brazil, a clear indica-
tion that that party had not yet been officially recognized by Peking.92
The decision to split the Cormunist Parties on an international scale
was anounced by Chou Yang in a Peking speech on the theme, "Everything
tends to divide into two," 9 3 which was not however published until
December 27, 1963. The first officially recognized pro-Chinese splinter
party in Latin America was founded in January 1964, when an unauthorized
"national conference" of the Peruvian Communist Party allegedly convened
92
' Recognition appears to have been afforded in the course
of 1964. On October 1964 Peking Review Vol. VII, No. 42, published
a resolution by the Communist Party of Brazil denouncing the Soviet
decision to hold a wNorld meeting of the international Communist
movement.
93 See W. E. Griffith,'Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, Reprinted from
The China Quarterly, January-March 1966, London, 1966, p. 16.
See The People's Daily of that date.
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by a majority of the Central Committee members and representatives
from 13 out of 17 regional committees and attended by observers of the
Communist Youth League gathered in order to pass a resolution which
"condemned the revisionist theories of Tito and his followers, and laid
emphasis on the correct stand of the Chinese Communist Party in the
ideological controversy with the revisionists." In direct contradiction
to the Guevara article published in Peking Review only a few days before,
the resolution called for "the founding of a strong anti-imperialist
national front uniting all forces which can be united, including the
bourgeoisie." The conference then proclaimed the expulsion from the
party of its entire leadership headed by Raul Acosta, Jorge Del Prado
and Juan Barrios, who were denounced as "corrupt elements" who had
committed "acts of betrayal" and "had degenerated politically and
1 5
morally to an unheard-of extreme'.
The following month, the Spaitacus group in Chile published the
first number of its theoretical organ, Principios Marxista-Leninistas.
This contained a highly revealing report on a meeting of the group held
in Santiago "at the end of January" and allegedly attended by soie
60 Miarxist-Leninists of the Chilean Communist Party. " In a resolution
the meeting, "Salutes the Communist Party of China, True Heir to the
Revolutionary Organization which should never be abandoned." A further
resolution condemned the Chilean Party leadership for its alleged
abandonment of Marxist-Leninist principles and went on to state: "We
reject with equal firmness the Trotskyite stand and all pseudo-arxist
forms of revolutionary struggle.'
9 5See Peking Review, Vol. VIT, No. 7, February 14, 1964.
9 6 A summary of this report was later published in Peking Review,
Vol. VIII, No. 18, May 1, 1964.
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The anti-Trotskyite theme was elaborated in a speech by one of the
participants who said that there was a "paradoxical identity" between the
Trotskyites and revisionists on the question of Stalin. "They put the blame
for all the errors committed in the U.S.S.R. on Stalin." He further declared:
The presence of Trotskyites in the party organization is
also harmful because they are liable to putschist adventurism
and political adventurism and would in the upshot create the
constant splits which we have seen. . . . I think we must
adopt the firm stand of not having anything to do with the
Trotskyites.
Beware of the Trotskyites whose factional activities are
still the best ally of the bourgeoisie in preventing the
working class from closing its ranks under the banner of
Marxism-Leninism.
The significance of this document published in the Spartacus organ
is that it clearly reveals the conditions laid down by the Chinese for
membership in the new Communist Parties they were sponsoring in Latin
America: Unconditional acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party as the
"heir to the revolutionary organization which should never be abandoned,"
that is, as the leader of the international communist movement in the
same role and with the same powers that the Communist party of the
Soviet Union had held in the days of the Comintern; acceptance of
the Chinese line in all its details, including the defense of Stalin
and the rejection of Trotskyism. The condemnation of "all pseudo-Marxist
forms of revolutionary struggle" and of "putschist adventurism and
political adventurism also implied, of course, a rejection of Guevara's
theories. This then is what the Chinese wanted in Latin America: puppet
parties securely tied to strings manipulated in Peking. Such a program
was unacceptable to the only groups that were actually conducting an
armed revolutionary struggle in Latin America: the extreme nationalists
of Castroite persuasion.
After the Brazilian and the Peruvian, only one more pro-Chinese
splinter Party was officially recognized by Peking in Latin America.
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In July 1965, the pro-Chinese faction of the Colombian Communists
met in an unauthorized "Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of
Colombia" at which it condemned the party leadership headed by Gilberto
Vieira as "renegades who, as leaders of a proletarian party, peddled
bourgeois ideas." A resolution passed by the new party claimed that:
revisionism has always represented the infiltration
of bourgeois ideologies into the other parties of the
proletariat. . . this imperialist policy has already
extended to the socialist countries. . . Yugoslavia
is the most outstanding case in point, where the people
have been robbed of the fruits of their revolution and
subjected again to capitalist exploitations. . . . We
shall not speak about the Eastern European countries here,
but in the Soviet Union certain features of capitalism have
already begun to appear as a result of modern revisionism."
And "Whether or not the working class has assumed power, it is necessary
to eliminate the revisionists as a political force."
The resolution also declared that:
China's nuclear capabilities are a substantial contribution
to the cause of world peace. They have smashed the monopoly
of atomic weapons, frustrated the imperialist blackmail and
filled the people's fighters who are waging an intense struggle
against U. S. imperialism with hope.
The resolutions passed at this Colombian splinter congress no longer
use the formula "national democratic" and do not demand incorporation of
the "bourgeoisie" or "'national bourgeoisie" in a united front. Instead
it is stated that "that there can be no peaceful coexistence between the
exploited and the exploiters and between the oppressed nations and
their oppressors in any country or area." "The only way out for the
Colombian people," says one of the resolutions,
is to seize state power by revolutionary means, or in other
words, to destroy the state machinery and replace it by a
people's political power to be formed. on the basis of the
Patriotic Front for Liberation and with the support of the
armed people.
In regard to the armed struggle the resolution stated: "In the present
5 It
conditions on our continent , the village is the natural battleground
for a people's war and "The struggle will be mainly in the countryside
and it will be waged by relying on the strength of the people. Sooner
or later it will spread to the whole of the country and involve all
social strata."
These are substantial concessions to the theories of Che Guevara.
It would seem that Peking had at last begun to regret having alienated
the Castroites by its insistence on a dogmatically correct "national
democratic" revolution. One must also keep in mind that the Peking
inspired Colombian resolutions were formulated shortly before the
publication of Lin Piao's new theis of world wide war of the
countryside against the cities. Declarations by the Peruvian pro-
Chinese Communist party dating back to September-November 1965 but
only published by Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 2, January 7, 1966 and
Vol. IX, No. 12, March 18, 1966, also avoid the terms "national
democratic" front and "national democratic" revolution, using instead
such terms as "revolutionary united front" "patriotic liberation front"
and asserting: "The first stage of our revolution is anti-feudal, anti-
imperialist, democratic and national liberation revolution." Of the
"national bourgeoisie," a resolution of "the 5th national conference
of the Peruvian Communist party" on November 15-16, 1965 says:
the national bourgeoisie which has a dual character
may participate in the revolution under certain conditions,
but because of its ties with imperialists and landlords, it
may betray the revolution.
The formula "national democratic revolution" does, however, reappear
in an article "The People Fight Ahead" in Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 5
9 7Quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VITI, No. 34, August 20, 1965.
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January 28, 1966. This time stress is laid on the armed character
of the revolution: "One of the salient features of the Latin American
national-democratic revolution in 1965" says the article, "was that
the idea that salvation lies in armed struggle was taking root in the
hearts of an increasing number of people.'
None of the three pro-Chinese Communist parties has so far been
able to make any headway. The Peruvian and Colombian parties are racked
by internal strife, with various personalities contending for leadership.
The Brazilian party suffered a severe setback through the military coup
of March 31, 1964, by which it was caught completely unprepared, and
has been exceedingly slow in recovering and adapting itself to conditions
98
of clandestinity. '
A lengthy editorial in the Peking People's Daily of April 30, 1964,
"Lessons from the Reactionary Military Coup in Brazil" failed to mention
the Brazilian splinter Party and pointed out as one of the lessons of the
coup:
The peasant question is a key question in the national
democratic revolution of the Latin American countries . . .
Brazil's national democratic revolutionary movement has
suffered a setback precisely because it did not have
a broad united front with a strong leadership. It has not
truly aroused and organized the broad mass of peasants and
other sections of the peoples. hence it could not organize
a powerful counterattack in face of the a ed rebellion
organized by imperialism and its lackeys.'
This article may well have been meant as an expression of dissatisfaction
8ffter the victory of the coup the seven members of the Chinese
trade mission and two Chinese newsmen were arrested in Rio de Janeiro;
they were only released and repatriated 9 months later. No convincing
proof of their participation in the activities of the pro-Chinese
splinter Communist party of Brazil has been made public by the military
authorities who conducted the investigation against them.
9 9 Quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 19, May 8, 1964.
56
with the Brazilian splinter Party, which had failed to establish a
working with Franscisco Julilo's Peasant Leagues or indeed with1 any
other non-Communist organization.
The Peruvian and Colombian pro-Chinese Parties have also been
unable to win a foothold among the peasantry or to engage in effective
cooperation with the Castroites; nor have they been able or willin7 to
engage in guerrilla activities o:f tleir own. The reason for these failures
of the pro-Chinese Communist arties of '.razil, Peru and Colombia is
obvious. The original stem from which these splinters derived is weak,
without influence on the political life of its country, doctrinaire at
the same time opportunistic. Since Chinese policies only attracted the
most sterile and Stalinist elements from these Parties, the new organisms
inevitably had to be even less effective.
Pro-Chinese splits occurred also in several other Latin American
countries. In Ecuador the secession was confined to a group of intellec-
tuals from Quito. In July 1963, the sum of $25,000 found on the person
of one of the leading pro-Chinese dissidents, Jose Maria Roura, was
confiscated at the airport on his return from a voyage to Europe. The
bulk of the Ecuadorian Communist Party under Pedro Saad, who controls
the Ecuadorian trade union confederation and has a following among the
workers of the country's main port and industrial city of Guayaquil,
has remained loyal to the Soviets.
In Santo Domingo a pro-Chinese group, the MPD (Movimiento el
Pueblo Dominicano) Dominican People's Movement, attempted a guerrilla
rising in 1963 and was again active in the ranks of Col. Caamano's
constitutionalists during the troubled events of 1965. This group has
also never been officially recognized by Peking. At a Peking Meeting of
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solidarity with the Dominican People on April 26, 1966, the
Dominican's speaker was a representative of the Castroite July 14
Movement, not of the MPD.1 0 0
In Bolivia a split of considerable proportions took place in the
summer of 1965. A statement by the pro-Soviet party leadership in the
World Marxist Review, Vol. VITI, No. 7, July 1965 admitted that 9 of
the 44 members of the Central Committee were involved in the secession,
that the secessionists had considerable strength in 3 departments and
had been able to set a parallel organization in 6 of the 14 departments
where the party has regional committees.101 Peking Review has failed to
report this split.
In August a pro-Soviet "Commission for the Defense and Reorgan-
10211
ization of the Paraguayan Communist party announced that the
majority of the party leadership under Secretary General Oscar Creydt
had left the Soviet fold, held a meeting with the leadership of the
Chinese Communist party,(and gone over to the enemy territory of
calumny and insult against the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and to acts of provocation."
The split in the Paraguayan Communist party--actually a party
in exile, with its headquarters and most of its membership in Argentina-
is the most interesting of the new splits which at the time of this
1 0 0See Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 18, April 22, 1966.
1 0 1 See also World Marxist Review, Vol. VII, No. 8, August 1965,
where the secessionists were attacked as "fanatics who see in armed
forces of struggle the only way of winning power" and as "ultra left
dogmatists."
In the Argentinian Communist party newspaper Nuestra Palabra,
Buenos Aires, August 25, 1965.
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writing,in the summer of 1966, have still not been officially
recognized by Peking. The point at issue between the party leader
Oscar Creydt and the pro-Soviet factionalists led by Obdulio Barthe10 3
is not as one might assume, armed struggle, with the pro-Chinese
Creydt adopting a more revolutionary line. Both factions are adamant in
contending that the Stroessner dictatorship can only be toppled by
force. In actual fact the question is academic; there has been no
guerrilla activity in Paraguay since 1963, and its resumption is highly
unlikely, since past failures have demonstrated the loyalty of a large
part of the peasantry to the Conservative Party, which is sympathetic
to the Stroessner regime. Both Creydt and Barthe are doubtless aware
of this. The reason for the break appears to be Creydt's refusal to
cooperate with the Cuban Castroites, i.e. the most radical, Leftist
extremist faction of the Febrerista party. The above mentioned statement
by the pro-Soviet group of Obdulio Barthe2ondemns Creydt for his
"vulgar and brutal treatment, his methods of imposition and disinte-
gration" in his relations with "the allies" and for his "calumnies"
not only against the CPSU, but also against "the United Party of the
Socialist Revolution of Cuba, against Comrade Fidel Castro."
It is significant that it was the pro-Soviet faction of Obdulio
Barthewhich pronounced itself in favor of Castro and the Castroites. For
the Russians, displaying more skill and elasticity in their Latin
Ameriean policies than the Chinese, had made a concerted and temporarily
successful effort to appease the Castroite movements in Latin America.
10 3This is rivalry of long standing. Already early in 1956 the
Russians, according to Osvaldo Peralva (op. cit., p. 163) tried to
replace the independent minded Creydt by Barthe, who appeared "more
loyal and pliant than Creydt to the bureaucracy of the CPSU." At that
time the maneuver failed because of the slackening of discipline in
the international Communist movement and the dissolution of the
Cominform.
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And Paraguay was one of the countries in which according to a resolution
passed by the Soviet-sponsored conference of Latin American Communist
parties held in Havana in November 1964, the struggle of the persecuted
patriots was to be actively supported by the Communist parties.1 0 4
Creydt's secession from the Soviet side would thus appear to have been
in protest against the new Soviet policy of encouraging cooperation
between the Latin American Communist parties and the Castroites.
Soviet Wooing of the Castroites
As Herbert Dinerstein has pointed out, 105the change in Soviet
policy was heralded as early as August 1964 in an article in the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union's theoretical organ Communist
which specifically approved armed struggle. Then came the Havana
Conference of Latin American Communist parties, from which the pro-
Chinese splinter parties were excluded.106 In the following year,
the Russians gave propaganda support to at least one important Castroite
venture not supported by the local Communist party: throughout the
second half of 1965 the guerrilla campaign launched by the Peruvian
Castroite organization (MIR) in June 1965 was enthusiastically hailed
by Radio Moscow in its broadcasts in Spanish and in Quetchua, the main
Indian language of Peru.
In march 1965, Cuba attended the Moscow consultative meeting
of 18 Communist Parties, which was opposed by the Chinese. That same
l04See the communique of the conference in Pravda, January 15-19, 1965.
The other countries named were Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras
and Haiti.
1 0 5In "Soviet Policy in Latin Anerica Memorandum RIV)4(67-PR,
May 1966, the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., pp. 28ff.
lo6For this see the Albanian Communist Party newspaper, Zer i
Popullit, February 16, 1965.
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month, Castro expressed his disapproval of the "Byzantine" polemics
107
of the Sino-Soviet dispute in a public speech. On September 14 of
that year, Castro and President Dorticos summoned the Chinese charg's
Taffaires to their presence in order to protest against the distribution
of Chinese propaganda materials to Cuban army officers and government
officials.108 In earlier years Peking Review and Chinese ideological
pamphlets had been freely on sale in Havana bookshops while the pro-
Soviet World Marxist Review was obtainable only in the Czechoslovak
House of Culture.1 09
Meanwhile Chinese disenchantment with Cuba was indicated by the
increasing scantiness of reports on that country in the Chinese press.110
In October 1965 Castro announced that his collaborator Ernesto "Che"
Guevara had left Cuba and given up his Cuban citizenship in order to
devote himself to the cause of revolution in other parts of the world.
Guevara had actually vanished from the scene as early as April of that
year
At the time of this writing the mystery of his disappearance is
still unsolved.
Guevara was not a Chinese stooge or sycophant. There was only one
brief mention of M]ao's contribution to the theory and practice of guerrilla
See Loy, Havana, March 16, 1965.
108For this see Castro's government statement of February 6, 1966
reproduced in Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 9, February 26, 1966.
1 0 9 Personal observation during visits to Cuba in 1961 and 1963.
ll0For this and for further evidence of Cuban-Soviet rapprochement
in 1965, see Daniel Tretiak: "Cuba and the Soviet Union: The Growing
Accommodation" Memorandum RM 4935-PR, July 1966, The Rand Corporation,
Santa Monica, Calif.
warfare in his book, Guerrilla Warfare, and none at all in his
1963 article reproduced in January 1964 in the Peking Review. To omit the
name of the greatest living theoretician of guerrilla warfare from an essay
on that subject may well have struck the Chinese as an act of discourtesy.
Nevertheless Guevara was much closer to Peking than to Moscow in his
views on both world affairs and domestic policy. Not only his vision of
an armed anti-imperialist struggle encompassing the entire continent, but
also his rejection of "material incentives" as advocated by the Russians
as a spur to industrial and agricultural production, coincided with the
Peking line. And on his last voyage to Africa, in December 1964 to March
1965, Guevara had made a number of statements which were clearly critical
of Soviet and Yugoslav economic policies, and of Soviet reluctance to
supply arms to "liberation movements" free of charge and in the quantities
needed. il Whether or not his removal is to be attributed to his anti-
Soviet and pro-Chinese views, it certainly signified a definite decline of
Chinese influence in the Cuban government.
In 1965 Castro also sided with the pro-Soviet Guatemalan Communists
in their conflict with the pro-Chinese guerrillas of Yon Sosa's November 13
movement. The Guatemalan Communists had, however, to agree to sponsor a
guerrilla movement of their own under the command of a Castroite, Luis
Turcios, in order to obtain Castro's backing. In his closing speech at
that Havana Tricontinental Conference l2of January 1966 Castro denounced
the November 13 movement as having fallen under the influence of Trotsky-
ites. 113
llSee Daniel Tretiak, op. cit. pp. 20-28.
1 1 2See Granma, Havana, January 18, 1966.
1 1 3The accusation is probably based on fact. The Latin American
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At the Tricontinental Conference, the new Soviet policy of
collaboration with Castro proved completely successful. The
conference was attended by delegates of Asian, African and Latin
American nationalist organizations as well as by Latin American
pro-Soviet Communists. The Russians had no safe majority, but
thanks to Cuban backing and skillful tactical maneuvering, they
managed to isolate the Chinese, and to prevent them from making
the conference a platform for their customary denunciations of
revisionism. The price which the Russians had to pay to Castro
consisted of verbal concessions to extremism and of agreeing
to permit a coordinating committee for the Latin American
revolution to be formed in Havana. The pro-Soviet Latin Ameri-
can Communist parties were more or less dragooned into member-
ship of this committee.
In maneuvering to isolate the Chinese, Castro was able
to make use of a serious tactical blunder which they had made
some-time before the -conference. In November of the preceding
year, Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade officials who had arrived
in Peking for discussions on a trade agreement for 1966 had
been notified of a cut in Chinese rice allocations: instead of
the 250,000 tons delivered in 1965, and of the 285,000 asked
for, China would only be able to provide Cuba with 135,000
Trotskyites emphatically claimed the November 13 movement
as their own, and the movement's grandiloquent "Declaration of
the Sierra Minas" published in the mimeographed journal,
Revolucion Socialista (organ of the November 13 movement)
January 1965, is phrased in Trotskyist terminology. Thus the
Communist dominated countries are termed " workers' states"
[Estados Obreros], an expression habitually used by the Trotsky-
ites alone.
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tons in 1966.114 The cut was officially motivated as resulting
from the increased needs of North Vietnam, but it was quite
obvious that the measure was actually a reprisal, and might
be retracted if Castro consented to turn back from the pro-Soviet
course which he had pursued since the end of 1964. Peking
later admitted as much by stressing that the trade talks
in the course of which the cut had been announced were only
"preliminary discussions" and that the matter could have been
taken up again at a higher level. 1 1 5
Both Washington and Moscow could have told. the Chinese that
this was not the way to handle Castro. le seized the chance to
put the Chinese in the wrong; on the eve of the tricontinental
conference ir a speech on January 2, 1966 he announced the Chinese
decision to the public. In doing so he cleverly feigned to
accept and even approve the Chinese explanation that the cut
was due to the Vietnam war.ll6 This of course deceived no one,
but made it difficult for the Chinese to raise the issue at
the conference in order to defend themselves. They were thus
at a disadvantage from the very start of the conference.
One month later, on February 6, 1966 the official newspaper
of the Cuban Central Committee, Granma, published a statement
114Peking Review, Vol. TX, No. 3, January 14, 1966; also
the Cuban government statement of February 6, 1966 as reproduced
by Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 9, February 25, 1966.
1 1 5See Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 6, February 4, 1966:
"If the Cuban side . . . genuinely hoped that China would
export more rice to Cuba in 1966 it could very well have
raised the matter in negotiations at a higher level as it
did in the past."
116See Granma, January 3, 1966.
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by Castro which constitutes the strongest public attack on
Peking yet made by any Communist leader. Castro accused the
Chinese government of "having in fact joined" the economic
blockade of Cuba by the "Yankee imperialists" and regretted
"having believed in the Chinese government's spirit of inter-
nationalism." He denounced the Chinese measure as "a criminal
act of economic aggression" and expressed his contempt for the
"Byzantine battles" the "academic chatter" of the Sino-Soviet
polemics. He complained of the distribution of Chinese propaganda
materials among Cuban officers and civil servants, calling it
"a flagrant violation of the elementary norms of respect which
must exist between socialist countries and even between non-
socialist ones." He related that as long ago as September 14, 1965,
he had told the Chinese charge'sd'affaires that
... these methods and practices were exactly the
same as those employed by the U.S. Embassy in our
country in its attempts to interfere in the internal
affairs of Cuba and in one form or another impose its
will on this nation; that our country had liberated
itself from that imperialism 90 miles away from
our coast; that our country would not accept similar
practices being imposed on us by another powerful
country 20,000 kilometres away; that we frankly
considered the attitude of the representatives of
the Chinese government to be an encroachment on the
sovereignty of our country and harmful to the prerogatives
that exclusively belonged to our government within our
frontiers; and that whatever the cost, our government
would not tolerate such things.
And finally he posed the question
whether there will also prevail in the world of
tomorrow, which revolutionaries are struggling to
establish, the worst methods of piracy, oppression
and filibustering that have been introduced into the
world ever since the emergence of class society, ever
since the rule of slavery, feudalism, absolute monarchy,
the bourgeois states, and in the contemporary world,
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the imperialist state.1 1 7
Peking's prestige with the Latin American left was
certainly severely damaged by Castro's revelation that it
had indulged in "imperialist practices" in its relations with
little Cuba. One might assume that Castro was now totally
and irrevocably committed to the Soviet cause. But this was
not the case.
The Shadow of Vietnam
In the same statenent which condemned China so harshly,
Castro also mentioned the missile crisis of October 1962. He
did this in a manner most inconvenient to the Russians, by
confirming, in an official statement made in his capacity as
Prime Minister, that Cuba had only "agreed to" --- not asked for --
"the installation of thermonuclear weapons on our territory"
and that it had done this not only in the interest of self-
defense, but "for the sake of strengthening the Socialist
Camp" -- a phrase which in this context could only be inter-
preted as meaning: in order to change the balance of nuclear
power in favor of the Soviet Union. He then reminded the Russians
of a painful fact: "and besides not only did we agree to have
them [the missiles] brought in but we did not agree to have them
taken out!"
Having thus stressed the revolutionary determination and
spirit of sacrifice of the Cuban people, which did not hesitate
to risk the dangers of thermonuclear war, nuclear attack on us",
he went on to demand massive *military engagement in favor of
Vietnam, thus clearly condemning the cautious policy of the
1 1 7Quoted from the English translation of the Castro statement in
Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 9, February 25, 1966.
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Soviet Union.
Our position is one! We favor that Vietnam should
be given all the help necessary!
We favor that help should be given in weapons
and men! We favor that the socialist camp should
run the necessary risks for Vietnam!
We are very much aware that in case of any
serious international complication we will be
one of the first targets of imperialism but we 118
are not worried by it and it has never worried us.
On March 31, 1966 Castro's spokesman Armando Hart demanded
drastic action against the American bombing raids on North Vietnam --
action which could of course only be taken if sufficient Soviet
aircraft, missiles and "volunteers" to man them were sent to
that country.
In the present situation of the war in Vietnam the
necessary tactical measure at this point is to develop
a military force aimed at paralyzing the bombings on
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam -- that is to put
out of action the Yankee aircraft which bomb the
territory of this country. It is of transcendental
importance for the victory over imperialism in Vietnam
to liquidate, with the means available and assuming
the necessary risks, the criminal aggression represented
by the bombers over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
It is indispensable to carry out definite efforts and
give decisive help in order to convert the territory
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam into a graveyard
of Yankee aircraft. It is necessary if circumstances
demand to be prepared to fight in Vietnma in the
defense of the integrity and life of that country.
The battle in Vietnam involves an essential question
of principle, as have been set out in this congress,
for the whole Communist ement, and especially for
the socialist countries.
The significance of this speech lies in the fact that Hart
made it in Moscow at a session of the 23rd Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, which he attended as the Cuban guest
118Quoted from the English translation of the Castro statement
in Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 9, February 25, 1966.
1 1 9Translated from Granma, Havana, April 1, 1966.
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delegate. The representative of a small nation of 7 million,
a late comer and maverick in the socialist camp and in the
international communist movement, was using a Soviet party
congress to demand a drastic change in Soviet foreign policy --
this was indeed a unique and unheard of occurrence!
It is probably these open demonstrations of Castro's
dissatisfaction with the Soviets that have persuaded Peking
to halt its polemics against him. The Chinese are not likely
to have forgiven him his harsh words, but it is to their advantage
not to force him totally into the Soviet camp by continuing hostil-
ities. In May of this year a trade protocol for the fiscal year
1966 was signed by the head of the Chinese trade delegation to
Cuba and the Cuban Vice Minister of Foreign Trade. The quantity
of rice to be delivered by the Chinese appears to be somewhat,
but not significantly higher than the figure of 135,000 tons
proposed by the Chinese in November 1965. The 1965-1966 work
plan for scientific cooperation between the Chinese Academy of
Sciences and the Cuban Academy of Science was also signed in
Havanaon the same day.120
With his usual tactical skill, Castro has thus managed
to maintain a certain freedom of maneuver between Moscow and
Peking. But that does not mean that his criticism of Soviet
policy is based purely on tactical considerations. He has every
reason to be genuinely dissatisfied with Soviet policy in Vietnam
and indeed with the policy of the entire "Socialist Camp.
12 0 See Granma, Havana, May 27. 1966.
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From 1961 onward he had insisted on joining the "Socialist
Camp" because he believed that as a member, he would enjoy the
protection of the Soviet nuclear umbrella' while spreading his
revolution to continental Latin America. The missile crisis proved
that this was an error: the Russians were not prepared for a
showdown with the United States over Cuba. le was officially
121
admitted to the "Socialist Camp" in 1963, but by that time,
the distinction appeared to be of doubtful value. The "Cam"
was racked by dissensions which were clearly far more serious
than he had hitherto assumed. And the continuous bombing of
North Vietnam from the spring of 1965 onward has since demon-
strated that mere membership in the 'Camp" without a defense
treaty, which Castro has not been able to obtain from the
Soviets, was not enough to provide him with military security.
The failure of the "Socialist Camp" to retaliate against
the bombing of North Vietnam has undoubtedly seriously weakened
the influence of the Soviet Union and the attraction of communism
in genera in Latin America. The most desperate elements of the
extreme left, those who might be described as "Guevaristas" are
determined to carry on an armed struggle without the prospect of
Soviet aid. These elements might well have fallen under Chinese
sway if Peking's policy in Latin America had been more flexible.
121
The Moscow May Day Slogans of that year for the first
time listed Cuba Lrong the countries actually "building socialism,"
see Pravda, April 8, 1963.
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Conclusion
A substantial body of opinion on the Latin American Left,
mainly among intellectuals, is receptive to Peking's doctrine of
guerrilla war, and to its rejection of all forms of "peaceful
coexistence with the United States. The Chinese, however, have
so far made no effort to give organizational form to this trend.
They have concentrated their organizational efforts on the small
and sterile Communist Parties of Latin America while neglecting
the far more dynamic "Castroite" groups.
From this one may draw the conclusion that for all its
talk of a world wide anti-imperialist struggle, Peking is
not really interested in such a struggle in far-away Latin
America. It appears to regard this region simply as one more
battlefield in its struggle to wrest the international communist
movement from Soviet control, or failing that. to wreck it in
order to make it ineffective as an instrument of Soviet policy.
